Abstract Throughout the management sciences, individuals and organizations compare alternatives with consequences that are risky and unfold over time. This tutorial examines representations of preferences that are sensitive to timing and risk. It reviews the logical foundations of the two major contending representations and finds that each of them is self-contradictory. In particular, properties of preferences that are consistent with discounting are also consistent with risk neutrality. In this sense, discounting implies risk neutrality. Then the tutorial briefly examines the prospects of developing new representations that are logically consistent. The tutorial ends by applying the various representations to a model of a supply chain contract.
Introduction
Humans exhibit preferences with regard to risk and timing. This tutorial describes efforts to represent those preferences in ways that are useful in professional practice and research, and are logically consistent. The efforts concerning risk preferences are well known, those concerning timing preferences are less well known, and those concerning the conjunction of timing and risk are obscure. The first conclusion is that the relationship matters, and the second is that, in a sense, discounting implies risk neutrality ! There are extensive literatures on perceptions, preferences, and choices regarding time (Bluedorn [5] ) and risk. Systematic procedures to manage risk over time date, at least, from Chinese and Babylonian traders during the third and second millenia BCE (Vaughan [31] ). Important milestones in the modern era include
• the writings on utilitarianism by Jeremy Bentham [2] in the 18th and 19th centuries;
• the proposal of the discounted utility model in a deterministic framework by Samuelson [28] ;
• the axiomatization of risk preferences in a static framework by von Neumann and Morgenstern [32] ; and
• the axiomatization of the time-discounted utility model in deterministic frameworks by Koopmans [18] and Williams and Nassar [33] .
Until about 20 years ago, there were separate skeins of literature on (a) the logic of preferences among risks and (b) the logic of preferences with regard to timing. Neither theoreticians nor empirical researchers investigated the interaction effects, and some researchers (myself included) believed that the two kinds of preferences were orthogonal; that is, they believed that the representation of preferences among risks was logically unrelated to the representation of preferences with regard to timing. It has become clear that the two representations are logically related.
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Professional practice, in contrast, has always had to contend with choices involving outcomes that unfolded over time in risky ways. In the absence of a consensus on a best comparison method, the unrelenting pressure of professional practice led to sensible ad hoc comparison methods. Numerous contending methods, some very different from each other, were advocated by writers and used as recently as 50 years ago (Solomon [30] ). However, a consensus among practitioners soon settled on expected present value (EPV), namely, the expected value of the present value of the time stream of monetary amounts. I regard EPV as a representation of preferences. Section 11 contains a glossary of acronyms for this tutorial, including EPV.
Structure of This Tutorial
Section 2 briefly describes two classical contributions in deterministic settings that presage trouble to come. The troubles are caused by the incompatibilities of different axiom systems, so §3 asks, "Why bother with axioms?" Then §4 formalizes several important notions and presents a simple example. Section 5 describes two representations that are "natural" alternatives to EPV; their logical justifications are presented in §6, which also sketches logical justifications for EPV. Section 7 explains why the representations are logically flawed. Section 8 explores the prospects of developing representations that are logically sound. Section 9 applies earlier sections to a prototypical model of a supply chain contract. Section 11 contains a glossary of acronyms used in this tutorial.
Harbinger of Trouble
Koopmans [18] axiomatized Samuelson's [28] suggested comparison of deterministic time series of numbers x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) and y = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n ):
where x y indicates that sequence x is at least as desirable as sequence y. Writers on preference theory most often call u( · ) in (1) a felicity function, and I refer to (1) as DF for "discounted felicity." Other labels for u( · ) are "instantaneous utility function" and "intraperiod utility function." We are not surprised to find nonlinear utility functions in the literature on representations of risk preferences; we refer to linear utility as "risk neutrality" and nonlinear utility as "risk sensitivity." However, Koopmans [18] analyzed a deterministic setting, and it is curious to find a nonlinear felicity function in (1). Although there is no stochastic element in sight (yet), I shall say that u( · ) in (1) is "risk neutral" or "risk sensitive" according to whether it is linear or not.
Samuelson's [28] suggestion was in a continuous-time setting, and Koopmans [18] axiomatized preferences among vector-valued (i.e., multiple attributes) discrete-time sequences. However, these distinctions play no role in today's topic; this tutorial is restricted to representations of preferences among discrete-time sequences of scalars and random variables. Henceforth, when I refer to Koopmans' [18] axioms, I mean only the axioms that are needed to yield (1) (not additional axioms prompted by geometric discount factors or his multiattribute model).
Samuelson and Koopmans, among the earliest Nobel laureates, were great economists; we shall see that Koopmans [18] eventually had great influence. Not long after it appeared, Williams and Nassar [33] wrote a Management Science paper without being aware of Koopmans' [18] work on time preference. INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
Additional information, including rights and permission policies, is available at http://journals.informs.org/.
Williams and Nassar [33] proved that their axioms yield comparisons of deterministic time series via
I refer to this representation as PV for "present value." If the felicity function u( · ) in (1) is affine, then (2) and (1) are the same; that is, PV is DF combined with risk neutrality! This is a simpler and less restrictive representation than (1), so you should demand to know the ways in which the Williams-Nassar axioms are more restrictive than those of Koopmans. Surprisingly, representation (2) is based on essentially the same axioms that Koopmans [18] used! Although 44 years have passed since Williams and Nassar [33] appeared, it remains the least restrictive axiomatic justification of discounting in a deterministic environment.
Various definitions of risk neutrality (Keeney and Raiffa [17] ) correspond to linearity of a utility function, so one of the interpretations of the contrast of (1) and (2) is discounting implies risk neutrality. However, deterministic settings are devoid of "risk." The linkage of discounting and risk neutrality would be much more disturbing in a stochastic setting, and we shall see that it occurs there too.
I had the interesting experience of informing Koopmans and Williams about each other's papers. At the time, neither they nor I appreciated that the felicity function in Koopmans' representation is superfluous.
Although Koopman's [18] representation was justified in a deterministic setting, it has become the rationale for the dominant representation in stochastic settings. There too, we shall see that the felicity function is superfluous in the same sense as here.
Why Bother with Axioms?
From a practical point of view, why bother with axioms? As consultants, should we not map our client's actual preferences, and then use that map to optimize on our client's behalf? The problem is that it is a frighteningly complex task to estimate either time or risk preferences directly, and the estimation of the conjunction of time and risk preferences is more formidable. In practice, we usually reduce the complexity of such tasks by representing preferences with canonical forms, and then we proceed to estimate the parameters of the canonical forms.
For example, in many settings there are good theoretical reasons to use an exponential model for a felicity function, i.e., u(a) = −e −λa , where λ > 0 parameterizes risk sensitivity and −∞ < a < ∞. This reduces the original daunting task of mapping risk preferences to the estimation of λ. Continuing in this vein, we could also estimate the discount factors β 1 , β 2 , . . . , β n in (1) by adopting the canonical form β j = α j−1 , j = 1, . . . , n and estimating 0 < α < 1.
After estimating α and λ, why not discriminate between (1) and (2) in the following way? If the estimated value of λ is small (and also the interesting values of |a| are small), then u( · ) is approximately linear, so use (2) . Otherwise, use (1) .
The problem arises in our desire to avoid totally ad hoc modeling of preferences; that is, we try to appeal to an underlying rationale for the canonical form that we use. We appeal to the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms to justify our use of a felicity function instead of mapping risk preferences without any reduction. We appeal to Koopmans' [18] axioms to justify our use of (1) instead of mapping timing preferences without any reduction. We appeal to the Williams and Nasser [33] axioms for the same reason, to justify the present value reduction without using a felicity function (again, instead of mapping timing preferences without any reduction).
In summary on this point, we can of course employ whatever canonical form we wish to represent preferences. However, we turn to sets of axioms and their logical consequences INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
to provide underlying rationales for the ways in which we represent preferences. Thus, the axioms to which we appeal can profoundly affect our conclusions when we optimize on our client's behalf. I return to this point in §5.2.1.
Important Notions
This section formalizes preferences among random sequences, EPV, felicity functions, and discount factors. It presents a simple example and ends with additional portals into research on pure time preference.
Expected Present Value and Expected Discounted Felicity
In a well-defined setting, let X = (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n ) be a sequence of random monetary amounts; that is, X is a real-valued discrete-parameter stochastic process. Let V denote a set of discrete-parameter real-valued stochastic processes. Into this setting, we insert an individual with preferences among the sequences in V . 
where E(X j ) denotes the expected value of the random variable X j . Throughout this tutorial, I assume that expected values exist and are finite. EPV in (3) is risk neutral because the role of each random variable depends only on its expected value. This representation can be viewed as replacing scalars with random variables in PV, namely, (2), and then taking expected values.
In the same way, one can replace scalars with random variables in the SamuelsonKoopmans representation (1) and take expected values. The result is
I refer to this representation as EDF for "expected discounted felicity." EDF is sensitive both to risk and time, and it has other virtues that are discussed later in this tutorial. EDF has become nearly the sole representation of time-risk preferences in economics and finance.
Discount Factors
The most frequent representation of time preference is consistent with calculating compound interest, namely,
with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, so
In this tutorial I make neither the geometric assumption in (5) nor any other assumption about the dependence of β j on j. However, I think that (6) is a reasonable and innocuous characterization of impatience. It is sensible to choose a scaling that causes β j ≤ 1, and I make that assumption henceforth. Empirical researchers (Loewenstein et al. [21] ) have shown that in some settings there are better models of humans' pure time preference (particularly hypergeometic discounting) INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
Additional information, including rights and permission policies, is available at http://journals.informs.org/. Figure 1 . Joint distribution of components of X, Y , and Z. 
than the geometric discount factors in (5). However, the functional dependence of β j on j is not the focus of this tutorial, where "discount factor" means merely a nonnegative scalar β j ≤ 1.
Example
This example has several purposes. It uses three of the simplest processes in which risk and time both play roles. The three processes, labeled X, Y , and Z, have two periods (n = 2), and their components in each period can take only two values. The joint distributions for X, Y , and Z are shown in Figure 1 . The initial purpose of the example is to show that EPV and EDF yield different rankings of X, Y , and Z. In §5.3, I return to this example with two additional representations and explore the dependence of the rankings on β 2 and the degree of risk sensitivity in the felicity function.
Notice that E(X 1 ) = E(Y 1 ) and E(X 2 ) = E(Y 2 ); so if preferences are consistent with EPV, then X ∼ Y regardless of the numerical values of β 1 and β 2 . Now fix β 1 = 1. The components of Z have different expected values than those of X and Y , so we find that X Z under EPV regardless of the value of β 2 ∈ (0, 1).
If preferences are consistent with EDF with β 1 = 1, β 2 = 0.9, and the felicity function u(a) = 1 − e −a , then X Z and Z Y , which I write X Z Y . In comparison to X 2 , the volatility of Y 2 so adversely affects EDF that it more than offsets the small advantage of Y over Z in expected values.
Previous Research on Time Preference
I assume that this audience is aware of the large theoretical and empirical literature on risk preference. There are outstanding but dated entries to the literature (Luce and Raiffa [22] , Keeney and Raiffa [17] ); additional theoretical work has been done since the more recent of these two books, and the empirical side is still expanding rapidly.
In addition to the citations earlier in this document, there is a rich empirical and theoretical literature on time preference. Among the many investigators of deterministic models of time preference and impatience, see Lancaster [20] , Fishburn [11] , and others cited by Fishburn and Rubinstein [13] and Frederick et al. [14] . To study a problem in growth theory, Epstein [9] introduces a stochastic model that relates time preference and risk preference.
Meyer [24] uses the rationale in §6.2 of this tutorial to compare alternative sample paths and, from there, to justify a representation that is presented and discussed later in this tutorial, namely, the expected value of the discounted felicity. Meyer [24] implicitly assumes that the set of axioms underlying time preference is orthogonal to the set of axioms underlying risk preference.
This tutorial is an outgrowth of an extended effort to answer a question that was asked by Rosenthal [27] , who wondered if the two axiom systems might be related. They are indeed related, and I dedicate this tutorial to his memory.
It is unclear whether the previously cited studies and the issues raised in this tutorial are related to investigations of consistency in intertemporal choice preference structures. See Kreps and Porteus [19] , Johnson and Donaldson [16] , Machina [23] , and their references. INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
Two Alternative Representations of Time-Risk Preferences
This section presents two representations of time-risk preferences that are "natural" alternatives to EDF.
Expected Felicity of Discounted Felicity
The EDF representation is additively separable, so the separability literature (Blackorby [3] , Blackorby et al. [4] ) is relevant to the representation of intertemporal preferences. In spite of the breadth, depth, and duration of the considerable attention to representing time-risk preferences, inconsistencies abound in professional practice and in research literatures. Under Koopmans' [18] axioms, there is a felicity function u and discount factors β 1 , β 2 , . . . , β n that satisfy DF with geometric discounting, i.e., (1) with (5), for all deterministic scalar sequences x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) and y = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n ). Equation (1) is repeated here for convenience:
If x and y were replaced by stochastic processes 
We are interested in the particular instance in which A and B are the discounted felicities of X and Y , respectively:
that is, if preferences are consistent with the axioms of Koopmans [18] and also consistent with the axioms of von Neumann and Morgenstern [32] (or the elegant generalization by Herstein and Milnor [15] ), for stochastic processes X and Y ,
I shall refer to representation (8) as EFDF, for "expected felicity of discounted felicity." Although EFDF arises naturally from the conjunction of EDF and axiomatic preference theory regarding risk, I do not know anyone (including myself) who advocates its use. A comparison of (4) with (8) suggests that the former, EDF, may be inconsistent with standard axioms of risk-preference theory. This suggestion will be confirmed in §7.2. INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
There are three disturbing conclusions at this point. First, if the axioms of Koopmans [18] and of von Neumann and Morgenstern [32] are logically consistent and the felicity function is nonlinear, then preferences are consistent with EFDF, but they are not consistent with EDF, and that is the most widely employed representation of time-risk preferences. Second, if the axioms of Koopmans [18] and of von Neumann and Morgenstern [32] are logically consistent and the felicity function is linear, then preferences are consistent with both EFDF and EDF, but both representations are risk neutral. Third, if the axioms of Koopmans [18] and of von Neumann and Morgenstern [32] are not logically consistent, then there is no known logical rationale for the most widely employed reduction of time-risk preferences.
Expected Felicity of Discounted Value
The axioms of Williams and Nassar [33] yield comparisons of deterministic time series via (1), i.e., DF, in which the felicity function u is the identity function; that is, (2), namely,
The same reasoning that led to (8) from (1) can be applied here. The conjunction of the von Neumann-Morgenstern and Williams-Nassar axioms suggests the following representation of time-risk preferences among stochastic processes X and Y :
I refer to this comparison as EFPV for "expected felicity of the present value." Unlike EFDF, EFPV has been employed for decades. Although its use in research and professional practice is dwarfed by that of EDF, decision analysts have made EFPV a staple in their pedagogy, research, and professional practice. Notice that EPV, namely, (3), occurs when the felicity function is affine in EDF, EFDF, and EFPV. This representation has time sensitivity but risk neutrality, and it dominates operations research and engineering. Do EDF, EFDF, and EFPV have logically sound justifications, and can they be reconciled? Whatever assumptions would justify EDF, does EFDF emerge from the imposition of additional assumptions, or the converse? Whatever assumptions would justify EFDF, does EFPV emerge from the imposition of additional assumptions, or the converse?
Again, Why Bother with Axioms?
In §3 I argue that axiom systems and their logical consequences demand our attention for the following reason. In applied research and professional practice they influence our choices among canonical forms to model preferences. Therefore, it is important to determine whether the only known basis for EFPV, namely, the combination of the axioms of von Neumann and Morgenstern [32] and Williams and Nassar [33] , is logically consistent. If not, then EFPV too would be relegated to the large collection of entirely ad hoc representations of preferences that are devoid of an underlying rationale.
Revisiting the Example
Here, I revisit the example in §4.3 with the criteria EFDF and EFPV. I use the joint distributions in Figure 1 and β 1 = 1, but I treat β 2 and λ in the felicity function u(a) = −e −λa as parameters. It is appropriate to interpret λ as a metric of risk sensitivity; that is, for each a, u (a) is an increasing function of λ. In §4.3 I used λ = 1 and β 2 = 0.9. Table 1 shows the ordering of X, Y , and Z with representations EPV, EDF, EFDF, and EFPV for λ = 0.1, 0.5, 1, and 2, and β 2 = 0.5, 0.8, 0.9, and 0.99. Each row corresponds to a particular combination of values of λ and β 2 . INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
Additional information, including rights and permission policies, is available at http://journals.informs.org/. 
The table has several important features.
• There is a preference reversal on every row. Regardless of the indices λ and β 2 of pure risk sensitivity and pure time sensitivity, the ranking of X, Y , and Z depends on the representation. The representation matters !
• Each block of four rows has the same pure risk-sensitivity metric, i.e., the same value of λ. Although successive blocks correspond to heightened risk sensitivity, the ordering in the EDF column does not change. In that column, as β 2 takes the values 0.5, 0.8, 0.9, and 0.99, each block of four orderings is the same regardless of the value of λ. Therefore, EDF is less sensitive to risk than EFDF and EFPV.
Multiattribute Preference Theory
The comparison of two stochastic processes X = (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n ) and Y = (Y 1 , Y 2 , . . . , Y n ) can be regarded as the comparison of two n-dimensional outcomes in a setting devoid of temporal considerations. There is extensive literature on the representation of multiattribute preferences; why not apply it here? Miyamoto and Wakker [25] unify and generalize the literature on representations of multiattribute preference orderings that had been reviewed 20 years earlier (Dyer and Sarin [8] , Farquhar [10] , Fishburn [12] , Keeney and Raiffa [17] ). Indeed, a section of Miyamoto and Wakker [25] obtains the EDF representation (4). Why not leave well enough alone?
The answer is that multiattribute prefence theory, devoid of temporal considerations, does not invite the discounting concept that we wish to understand. Similarly, theorizing regarding intertemporal preferences does not invite pure risk notions such as risk neutrality. The issue at hand is how to represent preferences that are sensitive to both risk and timing.
Here, I followed EDF to the EFDF representation, and that bizarre representation raised the specter of a logical flaw somewhere. We shall see that discounting and the existence of a felicity function cannot be readily reconciled. This negative result calls into question EDF, EFDF, and EFPV, and encourages the search for logically sound representations of time-risk preferences.
Justifications for EPV, EDF, and EFPV
This section sketches justifications for using EPV, EDF, and EFPV. INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
Justification for Expected Present Value
EPV (3) is the most convenient of the three representations in professional practice and research. Unlike the other two, it neither requires the estimation and use of a felicity function, nor displays sensitivity to risk. In operations research, EPV is the optimization criterion in the large literature on discounted dynamic programming (Markov decision processes) and its many applications in research and professional practice (Puterman [26] ). This includes the bulk of the literature on multiperiod inventory and production models. Some financial economists assert as follows that EPV is the appropriate criterion in large nonfinancial firms that operate in well-informed markets. They argue that such firms should be risk neutral because they can hedge risks at negligible relative costs. Thus, they should make decisions according to EDF (4) with an affine felicity function u( · ), namely, according to EPV (3).
The axiomatic justification of EPV in §7 uses the following notation and axioms.
6.1.1. Notation. Recall the notation V for the set of n-period real-valued stochastic processes. Let 0 = (0, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ V , let X + Y ∈ V be the stochastic process (
and for a scalar b, let bX be the stochastic process (bX 1 , bX 2 , . . . , bX n ) ∈ V . Therefore, V is a real vector space with zero element 0. Let e t ∈ V denote the stochastic process that has +1 in the tth coordinate and 0 everywhere else. 
Axioms Regarding a Preference Ordering on
Axiom (11) is called rationality and assumes that preferences are transitive and complete; that is, (a) for every X and Y in V , either X Y or X Y or both, and (b) if X Y and Y Z, then X Z. Axiom (13) is called continuity and assumes that preferences are "smooth." It precludes a "large" change in the desirability of a stochastic process if there is a "microscopic" change in the process itself. Although rationality and continuity assumptions occur throughout preference theory, human preferences sometimes violate them. Axiom (14) is a nontriviality assumption because it assumes, basically, that "something is better than nothing." This tutorial is not concerned with the dependence of β j on j, so there is no axiom (such as e j e j+1 ) that enforces β t ≥ β t+1 .
Axiom (12), called decomposition, is the most controversial and objectionable of the four axioms. As an example of its impact, if 0 X, it implies (Sobel [29] ) that 0 X 2X 3X · · · ; that is, it precludes preferences that welcome some small gambles but avoid large ones. Nevertheless, (12) occurs in every axiomatic theory of intertemporal preference. However, (12) is not troubling in the deterministic settings where Koopmans [18] and Williams and Nassar [33] assume it. You should decide for yourself, following §7, if decomposition is too high a price for the justification of discounting in a stochastic setting.
The converse of decomposition, (12) , called composition is
Axiom (12) corresponds to a stochastic process X being as good as the status quo only if incrementing any stochastic process Y with X is at least as satisfactory as Y alone. The converse (15) corresponds to the status quo being at least as satisfactory as X if there is INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
any Y that is preferred to Y augmented by X. In a deterministic setting, the converse of (12) is as innocuous as (12) is itself. The situation is quite different in a stochastic setting where the converse of (12) is even more objectionable than (12) itself. The combination of (12) and (15) is a version of the "independence" assumption that is omnipresent in preference theory, and its descriptive validity has long been questioned (Luce and Raiffa [22] ).
Williams and Nassar [33] work in a deterministic setting and make assumptions (11) and (12) and their converse (15) and (14), a continuity assumption that is different from (13) , and other assumptions. They prove that these assumptions imply the existence of nonnegative scalars β 1 , β 2 , . . . , β n such that
that is, there are discount factors with the property that deterministic time series x is weakly preferred to deterministic time series y if and only if the present value of x is at least as large as the present value of y. This is precisely EPV in a deterministic environment.
Justification for Expected Discounted Felicity
Koopmans [18] works in a deterministic setting where he makes assumptions that include the existence of a (possibly nonlinear) felicity function u( · ) and axioms (11)- (15) . He proves that these assumptions imply the existence of nonnegative scalars β 1 , β 2 , . . . , β n such that
that is, there are discount factors with the property that deterministic time series x is weakly preferred to deterministic time series y if and only if the discounted felicity of x is at least as large as the discounted felicity of y. This is precisely DF, namely, EDF in a deterministic environment. EDF is the primary application of DF in professional practice and research. One of its virtues is apparent in Markov decision processes (MDPs) where the state space has the same size and structure as with the criterion of EPV (Puterman [26] ). By comparison, the EFDF and EFPV criteria increase the computational burden of optimization because the state spaces are enlarged (Chung and Sobel [7] ).
It turns out that the absence of a (nonlinear) felicity function in (16) and its presence in (17) are not explained by differences in assumptions. The next section moves from deterministic to risky (i.e., stochastic) settings and explains that the felicity function assumption carries the seeds of its own destruction.
Conundrum
Speaking loosely, one uses discount factors to describe time preference, and one uses a felicity function to reflect risk preference. In this section we find that time preference logically interacts with risk preference.
A Discounting Theorem and Another Justification of EFPV
Let S be the set of (real-valued) random variables, so for C ∈ S, the sequence (C, 0, . . . , 0), namely, C followed by n − 1 zeroes, is a stochastic process in V . Then the relation with V induces the following preference relation on S: if A and B are random variables, then A B if and only if (A, 0, . . . , 0) (B, 0, . . . , 0) . Of course, induces other preference orderings on S, but is sufficient for our purposes. INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
The following discounting theorem is proven in Sobel [29] . If with V satisfies axioms (11)- (14) , then there are unique discount factors β 1 , β 2 , . . . , β n such that
The present values of the X and Y sequences are random variables. So X is weakly preferred to Y if and only if the present value of the X sequence is at least as desireable (as a random variable) as the present value of the Y sequence. This theorem gives sufficient conditions for preferences in a stochastic setting to lead to discount factors and present values. Further assumptions in Sobel [29] , as in Williams and Nassar [33] and Koopmans [18] , imply that the discount factor β j depends geometrically on j.
The theorem makes no assertion about representing preferences on S, but suppose that preferences on S satisfy the von Neumann-Morgenstern (or Herstein-Milnor) assumptions. Then it follows from (18) that there is a felicity function u( · ) such that
that is, (11)- (14) and the existence of a felicity function imply that preferences are consistent with the EFPV representation.
A Risk Neutrality Theorem
The issue now is whether there is an interaction between the assumptions that yield the existence of a felicity function and axioms (11)- (14) . Risk neutrality is defined in various ways that boil down to a felicity function that is affine (Keeney and Raiffa [17] ). The following discounting risk neutrality theorem is proven in Sobel [29] . If with V satisfies axioms (11)- (14) , then the following properties are equivalent:
• ( , V ) satisfies (15), namely, composition, which is the converse of (12);
• there exists a felicity function;
This is the conundrum. We want to use a felicity function to model sensitivity to risk, so we yearn for a theory that encompasses nonlinear felicity functions. However, the second and third bullet points assert that the existence of a felicity function corresponds to risk neutrality! The surprising insight the general assumptions that permit preferences to be represented with discounting also imply risk neutrality. In this sense, discounting implies risk neutrality. In §2 we reached that conclusion in a deterministic setting by comparing (1) with (2).
How Tight Is the Corner?
We have been backed into a corner; how tight is it? Axioms (11)- (14) are sufficient for preferences to be consistent with discounting, but are they necessary? With (15) or, equivalently, the existence of a felicity function, they imply risk neutrality. It is an open issue whether "interesting" preferences can satisfy axioms (11)- (14) without satisfying (15) . Although the risk neutrality theorem in Alexander and Sobel [1] illuminates the issue, it does not resolve it.
I emphasize that the axioms do not reflect my selection of esoteric conditions. They are the least restrictive conditions that are known to yield a discounting representation. INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
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m-Dimensional Felicity Functions
This section explores a slightly different perspective that is suggested by an alternative proof of the risk neutrality theorem in a more general setting (Alexander and Sobel [1] ). Thus far, a felicity function is a real-valued function that maps a number to another number and that preserves preferences among random variables as follows. The random variables A of interest are the present values of stochastic processes. We seek useful m-dimensional utility functions u and orderings of R m such that
I exclude trivial ways of doing this that correspond to the expected value of a real-valued felicity functionũ( · ) with
For example, I exclude u(a) = (a, −a 2 ) with the ordering on R 2 that corresponds to the scalar of mean minus variance. It is well known that mean-variance trade-offs correspond to quadratic one-dimensional felicity functions.
I now assume that there is no real-valued functionũ( · ) for which (21) is valid for all random variables A and B. Put another way, I assume that the m-dimensional felicity function cannot be generated with a one-dimensional felicity function.
An example of an acceptable two-dimensional felicity function is u(a) = (a, −a 2 ), so E[u(A)] = (E(A), − E(A 2 )); the components are the mean and negative of the second moment of A. Let µ A denote the mean of A. Another acceptable example is u(a) = (a, (14) but not (15) .
The delicacy of these questions is illustrated by letting m = 2 and exploring the vector of signed moments of the present value random variable. First, let correspond to lexicographic ordering on R. This combination satisfies three of the axioms, but it does not satisfy the continuity axiom (13) . Second, let correspond to a weak notion of Pareto dominance; this satisfies all four axioms. However, if the notion were strengthened to the following definition, then it would fail to satisfy transitivity (11) . For m-vectors f = (f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f m ) and g = (g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g m ), if f = g, then f Pareto-dominates g if (a) f j ≥ g j for all j = 1, . . . , m, or (b) f j < g j for some j and f k > g k for some k.
Example: Supply Chain Contract
This section applies several representations of time-risk preferences to a Stackelberg game model of a wholesale-price supply chain contract. I show that models can remain tractable INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
following the insertion of (nonlinear) felicity functions. The two players are a retailer who faces a seasonal retail market with random demand D and a supplier from whom the retailer orders goods long in advance of the selling season. The supplier, who is the leader in the leader-follower game, announces a wholesale price that structures the newsvendor-like optimization problem faced by the retailer who then chooses an order quantity z. When the outcome of demand D occurs, it is too late for the retailer to change the value of z. In practice, the delays in shipping ordered goods in supply chains range from a few hours to a few years, the major risks can include supply disruptions and price changes, and the information may be asymmetric among the supply chain partners. The following model is interesting in contexts where the partners have essentially the same information, contract prices are firm, the risk of supply disruptions is low, and there is a lengthy delay between the retailer's placement of an order and its receipt of goods. Industries with these characteristics include heavy construction and mining equipment, and some high-fashion style goods.
Several variants of wholesale-price contracts oblige the retailer to make an initial payment of cz, where c > 0, and when demand materializes the retailer receives the revenue r min{z, D}. Depending on the contact details, c and possibly r depend on the wholesale price that the supplier initially sets. Therefore, the retailer's stream of revenue is a stochastic process X = (X 1 , X 2 ), where [6] for the variants of wholesale-price contracts that yield this structure.
Retailer's Decision with an EPV Representation
Here, the retailer optimally chooses z using the EPV representation (3) with β 1 = 1 and c < β 2 r. The retailer faces the following optimization problem:
Let F ( · ) denote the distribution function of demand D. This problem has a newsvendor structure, so the solution is z = z 1 , where z 1 satisfies
Retailer's Decision with an EDF Representation
Here, the retailer optimally chooses z using the EDF representation (4) with the same parameters as in §9.1 and a felicity function u( · ) that is concave, increasing, and differentiable. The retailer faces the following optimization problem:
Several steps lead to the conclusion that a solution is z = z 2 , where
This expression can be interpreted as equalizing marginal benefits and marginal costs. Now I show that z 1 ≥ z 2 , i.e., the introduction of risk sensitivity via EDF results in a lower order quantity than would occur with discounting and risk neutrality. This property has been mentioned in the absence of discounting. From (25), 1 − F (z 2 ) = cu (−cz 2 ) β 2 ru (rz 2 ) .
Using (23),
Concavity implies u (rz 1 ) ≤ u (−cz 1 ), so [1 − F (z 1 )] − [1 − F (z 2 )] ≤ 0, which implies z 2 ≤ z 1 . INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
The best-known rationales for the dominant representation are prescriptive analyses of preferences in deterministic settings by Nobel laureates Samuelson [28] and Koopmans [18] . If preferences with regard to timing and riskiness were orthogonal, then conclusions about intertemporal preferences could be straightforwardly applied to stochastic settings. This tutorial naively does this to obtain two representations. One is the representation that some decision analysts have long used, i.e., the expected felicity of the present value.
There is hardly any empirical research on the interaction of joint preferences with regard to timing and riskiness, and the prescriptive research is relatively recent. From an axiomatic perspective, it is now clear that preferences with regard to timing and riskiness are not orthogonal! The tutorial uses stochastic processes as the objects for which the decision maker has preferences. It sketches four axioms that imply that preferences among stochastic processes correspond to preferences among present values of the stochastic processes. The discount factors are endogenous to the preferences. All axioms chafe, but one of the four here, decomposition, is particularly objectionable. Unfortunately, every axiomatic justification of discounting invokes decomposition.
The present value of a stochastic process is itself a random variable, so the focus in the tutorial shifts to the implications for preferences among the present value random variables. The axioms that lead to the present value random variables have a surprising consequence. If the decision maker has a felicity function (a utility function for random variables), then it is linear. In this sense, discounting implies risk neutrality. This is a distressing conclusion because the reason that one uses a felicity function is to model risk sensitivity (i.e., the absence of risk neutrality).
There are at least two potential recourses to resurrect discounting with risk sensitivity. One is to search for weaker axioms that still imply discounting but do not imply that a felicity function is affine. Another is to represent preferences among random variables in terms of two or more attributes of those random variables; so the felicity function becomes a mapping to R m where m ≥ 2. This tutorial has a simple example with three two-period stochastic processes. It explores the rankings of the three processes according to the various representations of time-risk preferences. There is a preference reversal at every vector of parameters of the discount factors and felicity function; that is, the representation of time-risk preferences affects the ranking of the alternatives.
This tutorial ends by analyzing a stereotypical supply chain contract. The various preference representations yield tractable optimality conditions.
Glossary of Acronyms
This tutorial uses the following acronyms: DF-discounted felicity; EDF-expected discounted felicity; EFDF-expected felicity of discounted felicity; EFPV-expected felicity of the present value; EPV-expected present value; MDP-Markov decision process; PV-present value.
